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RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, EQUITABLE SERVITUDES,
AND THE FEUDAL NATURE OF COMPUTER
SoFrwARE LICENSING
THOMAS M.S. HEMNES*
BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE LICENSE
A discussion of computer software licensing appropriately begins with
the question of why a license is needed at all. The purchase or sale of a
truck, a lathe, a set of instructional manuals or a box of pencils does not
require a complex legal document. At most, terms and conditions of sale
are printed on the back of a purchase order, or on an invoice, and no one
worries about them enough to hire a lawyer. Negotiations are usually lim-
ited to price, credit, delivery and warranty terms. It does not take a lawyer
to figure these out.
Why should software be any different? The license agreement immea-
surably complicates what otherwise seems a simple, straightforward busi-
ness transaction. From the vendor's standpoint, the license impedes sales;
from the user's standpoint, the license frustrates purchases. For everyone
involved, the license agreement dramatically increases transaction costs.
It is tempting to say that a license agreement is required because com-
puter software is a type of intellectual property, while a truck and a lathe
are not. But this answer is wholly inadequate. A book contains every bit as
much "intellectual property" as a computer program, yet the purchase of a
book is not conditioned on a "shrink wrap" license agreement.1 For that
matter, a truck or a lathe may embody patented inventions, the benefit of
which ordinary people blithely buy and sell without aid of license agree-
ments every day of the week. Again, why should computer programs be
any different?
The answer to this question is largely historical. At some point in the
development of computer technology, perhaps during the 1960s, people
came to see computer programs as having value independent of the hard-
ware on which they operated.2 This created a challenge for lawyers. If
one represented a client, A, who wanted to make his computer program
available to B for a price, into what legal framework did this transaction
* Partner, Foley, Hoag and Eliot. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribu-
tions of Mark Clark to the analysis presented in this article and the assistance of Daniel
Schaeffer and Karen Cheyney in its preparation.
1. A "shrink wrap" license agreement requires the consumer to abide by the terms of
the license when he opens the protective packaging containing the software. Opening the
packaging means that the consumer consents to the terms of the license. There are ques-
tions regarding the enforceability of such purported agreements. See infra note 26.
2. See Robert W. Wild, Comment, Computer Program Protection: The Need to Legislate a
Solution, 54 CoP.NELL L. REv. 586, 587 (1969); Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Reviso of
the Patent and Copyright Laws, 81 HAav. L. Rav. 1541, 1543-45 (1968).
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fit? It wasn't exactly a sale or lease of the program, because, in the typical
case, A wanted to continue to use the program, and to make the same
program available to C, D and E for a price as well.
The transaction was more like a sale of a copy 9 f the program, akin to
the sale of a copy of a book or of a device embodying a patented inven-
tion. But this categorization had the difficulty that computer programs,
unlike books, were not clearly protected by copyright in the 1960s and
early 1970s.3 Prevailing wisdom held that protection for computer
software programs was precluded by the principle that mathematical for-
mulas and algorithms were not patentable. 4 In the absence of clear copy-
right or patent protection, providing a copy to B would enable B to make
other copies and sell or give them away to C, D or E, destroying A's
market.
Lawyers for software developers were therefore driven to the conclu-
sion that trade secret law provided the only protection for their clients'
programs. 5 Trade secrets partake of the plasticity of the common law.
Anything can be a trade secret, as long as it is, in fact, maintained in se-
crecy and provides a competitive advantage to its owner.
6
3. For a discussion about the copyrightability of computer programs under the 1909
Copyright Act, see Note, supra note 2. The Copyright Act of 1976 extended protection to
computer programs to an unspecified extent. S H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1976). It was not until 1980 that computer programs were definitively protected under
copyright law: "Any lingering doubts as to the copyrightability of computer programs was
dispelled by the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 which 'has the effect of clearly
applying the 1976 law to computer programs .... " 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[C], at 2-46.3 to 2-46.4 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980)); see Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 3028.
4. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (method for calculating "alarm limits"
during catalytic conversion process held unpatentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972) (method for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into binary numerals in a
digital computer held unpatentable). This impediment was substantially eliminated by Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), which allowed patent protection for the process of
curing synthetic rubber while not pre-empting the use of the mathematical formula embod-
ied in the process. It is now widely believed that patent protection for software programs can
be obtained by describing an invention that embodies a program to achieve a particular
result. SeeJOHN T. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAw, §§ 2.02-2.03 (1983 & Supp.
1992). Thus far, however, there have been few court cases testing the validity of such patent
claims. Id.
5. See, e.g., Cybertek Computer Prod., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1022 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1977); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 743 (Okla. 1980); see also LESTER
HORwrrz & ETHAN HoRwrrz, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING AND LITIGATION
§ 11.03 [3] [a] (1994);Wild, supra note 2, at 590-92; Note, supra note 2, at 1554-56. In the early
days of computing, the majority of programs were protected by trade secret law, if at all.
Unlike copyrights and patents, trade secret protection has been analogized to a blanket,
.protecting everything beneath it," including both ideas, and the expression of those ideas.
HORWITZ, supra § 11.03[3]; see also T. Buckman, Comment, Protection of Proprietay Interest in
Computer Programs, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 135 (1969).
6. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Section 757 defines trade secret as
follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical, compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserv-
ing materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. It
differs from other secret information in a business (see § 759) in that it is not simply
[Vol. 71:3
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A trade secret may be disclosed to others without losing its protected
status, as long as the persons to whom it is disclosed agree that they will
not themselves disclose it.7 This principle has the absurd implication that
something can be a secret even if everyone knows it, much like in the story
of the Emperor's New Clothes.8 This fiction nevertheless forms the basis
in commerce for trade secrets, since, without it, the first disclosure would
destroy the protected status of the secret.
So far, one might conclude that a software developer in 1970 could
have simply required purchasers of copies of the program not to re-sell or
otherwise disclose it to anyone else. This would protect the secret, while
giving the purchaser the bargained-for use of the program. Still, no li-
cense would be required-only a simple nondisclosure agreement.
Lawyers for vendors perceived, however, that such an arrangement
would violate an ancient tenet of the common law-that "restraints on
alienation" are generally unenforceable. 9 According to the United States
Supreme Court, "[t]he right of alienation is one of the essential incidents
of a right of general property in movables . . . ."10 The Supreme Court
could have included real estate and some intangibles as well. The right of
alienation finds expression in such diverse places as the antitrust laws,"'
the Bankruptcy Code, 12 the Copyright Act, 13 patent law,14 and article 2 of
information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business, as, for
example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of
certain employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or the date
fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the
like. A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the
business. Generally, it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a
machine or formula for the production of an article. It may, however, relate to the
sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for determining
discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of spe-
cialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office management.
7. Management Science of Am. v. Cyborg, 6 Comp. L. Serv. Rep. 921 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(distribution to 600 licensees under confidentiality agreements did not destroy secret); Data
Gen. Corp. v. Digital Controls Corp., 297 A.2d 433, 436 (Del. Ch. 1971), affd 297 A.2d 437
(Del. 1972) (distribution to licensees under confidentiality agreements did not destroy
secret).
8. See, e.g., AMY EHRLICH, THE RANDOM HousE BOOK OF FAIRY TALES 3 (1985) (adapted
from original by Hans Christian Anderson).
9. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 528-29 (5th
ed. 1956). Plucknett traces the principle of freedom of alienation to developments that oc-
curred about the year 1200. Id.
10. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911); see also
Meyer v. Estes, 41 N.E. 683 (Mass. 1895); see generally Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U.S. 353, 363
(1898); A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1075-82 (1st std.
ed. 1951 & Supp. 1959) (citing cases); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation
§ 100 (1981) (citing cases).
11. See Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 404.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(0(1) (1988) (authorizing trustee or debtor in possession to as-
sign any executory contract that the Bankruptcy Code allows them to assume, notwithstand-
ing any provision in the contract or applicable law that "prohibits, restricts or conditions the
assignment of such contract.") There are some limitations on this power. See infra note 71.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988) ("the owner of a particular copy... lawfully made under
this title . .. is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy.. ."). Section 109 contains certain restrictions on the
right of alienation, which are not here relevant.
14. "[O]ne who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them
becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or place."
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the Uniform Commercial Code.15 It serves a variety of societal interests,
including: promoting free commerce in goods; avoiding resale price main-
tenance and other restraints of trade; preventing springing interests that
could defeat the rights of an owner; providing creditors a means of recov-
ery on debts; and promoting competition. 16 As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 17 "[t]he incon-
venience and annoyance to the public that an opposite conclusion would
occasion are too obvious to require illustration."
18
Software is ordinarily made available in the form of some moveable,
tangible embodiment, such as diskettes or tapes. If A transferred title to
these chattels to B, B could transfer good title in the chattels to a person
who had not agreed to hold them in confidence, even if such a transfer
violated an obligation owed by B to A. 19 Like the little boy in The Em-
peror's New Clothes who dared to say that the emperor had no clothes
on, 20 the purchaser might lawfully tell the secret and thus destroy the basis
for the developer's rights.
2 1
To get around the conflict between the need for non-disclosure on
the one hand, and the right of alienation on the other, lawyers invented
the software license. The notion is to purport to give the user of the
software none of the indicia of ownership. Lack of ownership avoids the
'restraint on alienation" problem because the user never has more than a
bailment of the copy of the software. Unless the bailee is a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind,2 2 a mere bailee does not have the power to
transfer good title to a chattel.2 3 Thus, carefully drafted software licenses
never "sell" anything to the user, not even the copy of the program that is
delivered to the user.
2 4
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (holding that purchaser of
articles manufactured by patentee may re-sell the articles in a territory which the patentee
had granted exclusive rights to another person).
15. U.C.C. § 2-403(l) (1978) ("A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value.").
16. See, e.g., CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 1080 (quoting Meade v. Dennistone, 196
A. 33 (Md. 1937) ("restraints take property out of commerce ..
17. 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
18. Id. at 667.
19. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978) ("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his trans-
feror had or had power to transfer. . . ."); see also RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89
(2d Cir.) ("Restrictions upon the uses of chattels once absolutely sold are at least prima facie
invalid; they must be justified for some exceptional reason, normally they are 'repugnant' to
the transfer of the title."), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
20. See EHRUCH, supra note 8, at 3. t
21. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the question whether a purchaser of a copy
could be held to his seller's agreement not to disclose it.
22. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978).
23. Id.
24. See Miles R Gilburne & Ronald L. Johnston, The Protection and Enforcement of Trade
Secrets in Software and High Technology Information, in DANIEL T. BRooKs & MicHAE S.
KEPLINGER, SOFrWARE PROTECTION: CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT AND PATENT AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO TRADE SECRET 225, 239 (1982) ("[I]n light of policies against re-
straints on alienation, restrictions on use or disclosure of a licensed product are more likely
to be enforceable than with respect to a sold product.").
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With this addition, one has all of the ingredients of the classic
software license. 25 The license recites that the licensed program is a valua-
ble trade secret of the vendor, the use or disclosure of which without the
vendor's permission would cause irreparable injury. Indeed it would: law-
ful disclosure by any licensee would break one link in the chain of nondis-
closure obligations on which trade secret protection hangs. The license
further recites that the vendor retains all right, title and interest in the
copy of the program that is being provided to the user. This finesses the
restraint on alienation problem. The license permits the licensee to use
the program, but only to the extent provided in the agreement. Finally,
the agreement is signed by the licensee, to ensure its enforceability. 2 6
In most cases, the retention of "tile" in the "licensor" is little more
than a legal fiction. Although the license purports to create a reversionary
interest in the licensor at the termination of the license, few if any copies
of licensed software are ever returned to their licensors. Even when a li-
cense terminates, the license will ordinarily provide that the licensee may
certify that it has destroyed all copies of the licensed program in its posses-
sion as an alternative to returning the program. In reality there are very
few instances in which this is actually done. Instead, the licensee assumes
practical ownership of a copy, under the legal fiction that its possession is
a mere bailment.
Once lawyers persuaded software developers that they could not sell
their programs like books and instead had to demand that their customers
sign onerous license agreements as a condition to access to the software,
the floodgates were opened for lawyers to pile into the agreements all pro-
tections they could think of for their clients. Warranty disclaimers, limita-
tions on liability, noncompetition covenants and clauses indemnifying the
vendor against third party claims all seemed to be insignificant if the cus-
tomer were already willing to sign a rather burdensome license agreement
to gain access to the software.
The next section of this Article will demonstrate that the software li-
cense recreated one of the most ancient forms of property ownership.
II. THE FEUDAL NATURE OF SoFTWARE LICENSING
A. Characteristics of the Feudal System
As we have seen, the computer software license was an effort to sepa-
rate a right of possession from the right of alienation. The latter right was
not always a feature of our law. In feudal times, title to real property could
25. See infra Appendix for a representative computer software license agreement.
26. "Shrink wrap" agreements included in the packaging of computer software are not
signed; as a result there are nagging worries about their enforceability. At least one state has
a statute that makes such agreements enforceable. See LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. 51:1963-65 (West
1987). Portions of that statute, however, were found to be preempted by the Copyright Act.
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (E.D. La. 1987) (statute provi-
sions allowing software licensor to prohibit acts of licensee which are permitted under § 117
of Copyright Act were preempted and license provisions forbidding such acts were unen-
forceable), aftd 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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not be passed without the consent of the lord of whom it was held. 27 The
chain of title descended vertically from the Crown, rather than temporally
from one's predecessors in interest. 28 The Crown held all land as "lord
paramount."29 The Crown granted "tenures" in exchange for certain du-
ties or services.3 0 The grantee could grant "subtenures," also called "sub-
infeudations."3 1 If he did, the grantee became a "mesne lord" with
respect to persons holding of him. 32 Land so held of another was known
as a "feud," "fief" or "fee." The process continued through the layers of
society (sometimes seven or eight of them in all) until it reached the per-
sons who actually created the avails of the land, the "tenants paravail."
33
An important feature of the feudal system was the personal nature of
the relation between lord and tenant or vassal. The relation was created
through the ceremonies of "homage" and "fealty" by which the lord and
tenant bound themselves to one another3 4 Vassals owed duties of military
or other service (including in some cases payment of money) to their
lords.35 The lords also enjoyed the "incidents" of homage, relief, wardship
and marriage, aids and escheat.3 6 The lords, in turn, owed duties of pro-
tection to vassals. Plate 1 summarizes the feudal system of land tenure.
27. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 251; PLUCKNETT, supra note 9, at 539. This state-
ment may represent Norman views imposed on a rather different English custom. Id. at 517,
539-40.
28. There is some question whether "feudalism" as a unified doctrine ever existed
throughout Europe. See, e.g., PLucKNE'rr, supra note 9, at 509 ("All these characteristics of
feudalism ... are subject to infinite variation in every quarter of Europe ...
29. GLEASON L. ARcHRg, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 20 (2d ed. 1927).
30. Id.; HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, A TF.ATIsE ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PRop-
ERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND 13 (Carl Zollmann, abr. ed. 1940).
31. ARCHER, supra note 29, at 20; TIFFANY, supra note 30, at 14.
32. TIFANY, supra note 30, at 14.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 18; PLUCENETr, supra note 9, at 507.
35. CAsNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 253-54; PLucEeTrr, supra note 9, at 531-32.
36. CAsNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 254-56.
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There were two means of alienation in the feudal system.3 7 One was
the creation of a subinfeudation. 38 A second was the substitution of one
tenant for another.39 Either of them was potentially damaging to the abil-
ity of the tenant's lord or lords to realize the value of the services and
incidents that were due them. "In the case of substitution the incoming
tenant might be poor, dishonest, or unfriendly ...."-40 Subinfeudation
undermined the lord's ability to realize the value of the incidents of "ward-
ships, relief, marriage and escheat."
4 1
To prevent these threats to the lords' interests, the practice in Nor-
mandy was to require every subinfeudation and every substitution to be
confirmed by the tenant's lord and by every superior lord.42 This require-
ment was never clearly adopted in England, at least with respect to
37. See PLUCKNEIT, supra note 9, at 538; CASNER & LEAcH, supra note 10, at 259.
38. See PLUCKNETrr, supra note 9, at 538; CASNER & LEAcH, supra note 10, at 259.
39. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 9, at 538.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 538-39; TiwAY, supra note 30, at 20.
42. PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 539-40.
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subinfeudation. 43 As a result tenants in England were able to use subin-
feudation to realize the value of their holdings, while defeating almost
entirely the ability of their lords to realize more than nominal value from
their seignories. 44 The nobility acted repeatedly to remedy the prob-
lem. 45 The third Great Charter (1217) stated, "No freeman henceforward
shall give or sell so much of his land that the residue shall be insufficient
to support the service due in respect thereof to the lord of the fee."
46
More importantly, the celebrated Statute Quia Emptores4 7 abolished alto-
gether the practice of subinfeudation of an entire fief.48 In exchange,
however, it ratified the process of substitution of one tenant for another. 49
The Statute Quia Emptores has sometimes been cited as the well-
spring for the common law's hostility to restraints upon alienation.5 0 In
fact, as we have seen, English law and practice had favored alienation to a
greater extent than Norman law since a time that antedated the Magna
Carta. 51 Furthermore, the Statute Quia Emptores actually abolished an
important form of alienation-the practice of subinfeudation of the ten-
ant's entire fief.5 2 The Statute Quia Emptores did, however, expressly per-
mit any tenant in fee simple to sell part or all of his tenancy by substitution
without his lord's permission,5 3 and without payment of any fee to the
lord.54 The substituted tenant or tenants would hold directly of the
lord.55 Although the substituted tenant might be less reliable than the
one he had chosen, the lord always had recourse to his right of forfeiture
if there were a default in the new tenant's rendering of service to the
lord.5 6
43. Id. at 540; TiWA, Y, supra note 30, at 19-20. Plucknett suggests that substitution with-
out the lord's consent may have occurred in England, while Casner and Leach definitively
rule it out. Compare PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540 with CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at
259.
44. PLUcKNErr, supra note 9, at 539. A tenant could, for example, deprive his lord of the
value of the incident of wardship by selling the right to occupy his land for a substantial sum
(none of which would go to the lord) and then subinfeud the purchaser for a nominal
sum-"a rose at midsummer." Id. If the tenant died leaving a minor heir, the lord could
collect only the rose until the heir reached majority. Id.
45. See id. at 540.
46. Id. (quoting the third Great Charter (1217)); see also TinFANY, supra note 30, at 19-20.
Although designed to protect lords against loss of rights through alienation, Plucknett and
Tiffany agree that this clause had little effect. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540; TnTFFAN,
supra note 30, at 20. In any event, it was superseded in 1290 by the celebrated Statute Quia
Emptores, 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (1290) (Eng.). Id.
47. 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (1290) (Eng.).
48. Casner and Leach note that the prohibition on subinfeudations was achieved by
interpretation of the statute, as it did not appear in the text. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10,
at 260.
49. See PLUCKNE1-r, supra note 9, at 540.
50. See ARCHER, supra note 29, at 25.
51. See PLUCKNE=r, supra note 9, at 539-41.
52. See ARCHER, supra note 29, at 25; PLUCKNE-rr, supra note 9, at 540; TiffANY, supra note
30, at 20-21. Subinfeudation of a part of a tenancy, for example by the creation of a life
estate or an estate for years, continued to be permitted. TiEANy, supra note 30, at 21.
53. See CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 260.
54. See id.
55. See PLUCKNE=r, supra note 9, at 540; Tinar A, supra note 30, at 20-21.
56. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 253. By contrast, if a tenant subinfeuded his
entire fief to another and then defaulted in his services to his lord, the fief would forfeit to
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The Statute Quia Emptores represented a significant step in the con-
version of property from one in which the personal relationship of vassal-
age dominated to one in which the personal relationship took second
place to ownership of the land itself.57 By abolishing the creation of new
enfoeffments, the Statute Quia Emptores led directly to the eventual aboli-
tion of the feudal system as a whole.
58
B. Feudal Characteristics of Software Licensing
The system of software distribution under license is analogous to the
feudal system of land tenure. The computer program constitutes a trade
secret owned entirely by the program's developer. The developer dis-
closes the secret to distributors, who enter into a personal contract with
the developer. The contract recites that the secret still belongs to the de-
veloper (licensor) and binds the distributors to maintain the secrecy of the
program, and to pay certain royalties or other amounts to the developer.
The developer, in return, promises to defend the title to the software.
The distributors-mesne lords, in feudal terminology-enter into subli-
censes with end users. These end users-who derive benefit from the in-
tellectual property as tenants paravail-bind themselves to the distributors
on terms analogous to the distributors' contracts with the developer.
Neither the distributor nor the end user is permitted to alienate its rights,
either by sublicense or substitution, without the consent of the licensor.
As in the case of feudal ownership of real property, the personal rela-
tionship between intellectual property licensor and licensee is considered
a vital part of the relationship. Both copyright and patent licenses5 9 have
traditionally been considered mere covenants not to sue, personal to the
named licensee, and not assignable by the licensee without the consent of
the lord, but the lord would be bound by the terms of the subinfeudation. If the subinfeuda-
tion required only the payment of a "rose at midsummer," that is all the lord would receive.
PLUCKNE-r, supra note 9, at 539. The fact that such an obvious ruse could be used to defeat
the services due to a feudal lord suggests the view that the feudal system was never completely
implemented in England.
57. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 260.
58. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540-41; TlnFmNY, supra note 30, at 21. The statute's
prohibition against subinfeudation-which was probably intended to shore up the feudal
system by protecting the incidents of lordships-actually contributed to its demise. The ten-
ancies of mesne lords regularly terminated as a result of causes such as escheat (reversion to
the lord for lack of a surviving heir). With no new infeudations being created, the feudal
pyramid was inexorably flattened and, in the seventeenth century, it was abolished alto-
gether. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540-41; TIFFANY, supra note 30, at 21.
59. United States law seldom distinguishes between the assignability of copyright
licenses and patent licenses. For example, in Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1984), the court decided the transferability of a copyright license primarily by anal-
ogy with decisions relating to patent licenses. Id. at 1333-34. It cited only two cases regarding
transferability of copyright licenses, both without discussion, and one of the cited cases was
itself decided by reliance on patent decisions. Id. at 1333 (citing Ilyin v. Avon Publications,
144 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (copyright licensee had no right to assign its privi-
lege)); cf Mills Music v. Cromwell Music, 126 F. Supp. 54, 61-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (deciding
assignability of copyright license by analysis of whether contract involved "a relationship of
personal credit and confidence." (quoting Paige v. Faure, 127 N.E. 898, 899 (N.Y. 1920))).
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the licensor. 6° There is a strong sense that persons who create copyright-
able or patentable property select their licensees with care, and should not
suffer to have a different licensee imposed on them by assignment of the
license. To bolster this principle, software licenses typically provide that
they are personal in nature and not assignable or sublicensable without
the consent of the licensor.61 Plate 2 summarizes the typical system of
software usage. The parallels to the feudal system of land use are
striking.
62
60. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333-34 (citing Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886));
Unarco Industries, Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929
(1973)) (holding that trustee in bankruptcy did not have power under prior law to transfer a
nonexclusive copyright license, and relying on established patent authority); see PPG Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
930 (1979); Ilyir, 144 F. Supp. at 372 (applying traditional approach); Mills Music, 126 F.
Supp. at 61-62; see also 3 NIMMER ON CoPYIGrHT, supra note 3, §§ 10.01 [C] [4],10-02[B] [4];3
PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 16.01 [1] [b] (2ded. 1991).
61. See infra Appendix, § 3. There is a trend toward provisions allowing transfer of the
licenses of "off the shelf" software. The implications of such transfer, and of transfers to
which the licensor has not consented, are discussed later in this Article.
62. A further point of similarity is that the system of software licensing is, to a varying
extent, a fiction that is only occasionally enforced in reality. Thus, for example, non-assign-
ment clauses are frequently disregarded in practice, without any complaint from the
licensors.
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If one accepts that modern software licensing has taken a form that is
analogous to the feudal system of land tenure, it is worth inquiring
whether the pressures that undid the feudal system might not have ana-
logues at work in the context of software licensing. In particular, one
would expect to find a growing tendency to consider licensed rights in
computer software (or, for that matter, other embodiments of intellectual
property) to be alienable property of the licensee, rather than a personal
privilege granted to the licensee by the licensor. That would lead, in turn,
to commercial resistance against restraints on alienation, and even cases
holding that agreed-to restraints on alienation are unenforceable.
All three processes are already underway. To begin with, the tradi-
tional principle that a patent or copyright license is personal to the licen-
see is no longer followed in all jurisdictions. 63 The alternate line of
authority springs from the decision of Justice Traynor in Farmland Irriga-
tion Co. v. Dopplmaier.64 Beginning with the observation that earlier fed-
63. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
64. 308 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1957).
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eral common law limiting the assignability of patent licenses was not
binding following Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,65 Justice Traynor found no
reason to exempt patent licenses "from a general rule adapted to facilitate
the freest possible transfer of valuable contract rights .... "66 The court
held that assignability should be determined by asking, as to each license,
whether "the duties imposed upon [the licensee] may be of such a per-
sonal nature that their performance by someone else would in effect de-
prive the [licensor] of that for which he bargained, '67 or whether
"assignment would materially impair the [licensor's] chance of obtaining
the performance he expected."
68
The easiest case for permitting an unconsented assignment would be
a reorganization of a business, in which the use of the licensed product by
the successor in interest is in practical terms indistinguishable from that of
the original licensee. For example, in Synergy Methods, Inc. v. Kelly Energy
Systems,69 Judge Pettine allowed the assignment of a technology license in
connection with a merger.70 A harder case occurs when the licensee is to
perform substantial services on behalf of the licensor, as, for example, in
the case of a distributorship agreement. The assignee might be less capa-
ble of performing these services than the original licensee was, thus de-
priving the licensor of the benefit of the bargain. Even this consideration
might be overcome, however, in reorganization proceedings where the
success of a debtor's reorganization might well depend on its ability to
transfer valuable licensed rights to a successor entity. 71 Thus, the bank-
65. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
66. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d at 740.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 741.
69. 695 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (D.R.I. 1988) (quoting Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning
Co., 182 P.2d 182, 188 (Cal. 1947) (Traynor, J.)) (validity of a transfer resulting from a
change in the form of the licensee's business "depends upon whether it affects the interests
of the parties protected by the nonassignability of the contract.").
70. Contra PPG Industries, Inc. v. Vanguard Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093-94 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930 (1979).
71. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee or debtor in possession to assign any ex-
ecutory contract that the Code allows them to assume, "notwithstanding a provision in an execu-
tory contract or... in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts or conditions the assignment of
such contract," subject only to an obligation to provide "adequate assurance of future per-
formance" to the other party. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (1988) (emphasis added). The trustee/
debtor-in-possession is barred from nonconsensual assumption of leases and licenses only to
the extent that "applicable law excuses [the licensor] ... from accepting performance from
or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or debtor in possession,
whether or not such contract... prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties." 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1) (A) (1988). Therefore if a software licensee were in bank-
ruptcy and the license were held not to be "personal" in nature, as seems quite possible, the
licenses could be transferred without the licensor's consent, even if they contained antias-
signment clauses. See, e.g., In re Taylor Mfg., Inc., 6 B.R. 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
There is authority in the First and Fifth Circuits, however, which holds that the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits assumption and assignment in spite of "state laws that enforce contract
provisions prohibiting assignment"; by contrast, laws "that forbid assignment even when the
contract is silent.., are to be heeded." In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 28-29 (1 st
Cir. 1984) (invalidating assignment of franchise agreement because state statute required
franchisor's consent to transfer); accord In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir.
1983) (assignment of airline's airport lease disapproved without airport's consent because
District of Columbia Code and FAA regulations required such consent). The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a trustee or debtor in possession in bankruptcy has no greater
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ruptcy court in Matter of Sentty Data, Inc.72 held that a software distribution
agreement was transferable without the licensor's consent because it was
not personal in nature.
73
At the same time that the personal nature of the license relationship
has come under question, software licensees have bargained for, and won,
more of the indicia of ownership. Today, it is common for a licensee to
negotiate for a "fully paid up, royalty free, perpetual" license to use a basic
item of software. Although it is probably unnecessary, 74 language of this
kind increases the licensee's comfort level that the vendor's bankruptcy
cannot trigger a forfeiture of the licensed rights, which may be vital to the
operation of the licensee's business. Even if the vendor's pricing strategy
contemplates a stream of payments rather than a single, up front payment,
the vendor can accommodate this request because it can tie a stream of
payments to "updates" and "maintenance" of the software, rather than to
the basic right to use it.
A factor contributing to vendors' tolerances for such perpetual
licenses is the expanded scope of copyright and patent protection for
software. The original justification for going to the trouble of a licensing
agreement was to protect the software as a trade secret because other
forms of protection were at best of doubtful validity through the early
1970s. 75 Since that time, the United States Copyright Act has been
amended to extend copyright protection explicitly to computer pro-
grams; 76 the European Communities have adopted a Directive requiring
all member states to protect computer programs under copyright;77 and
the courts, particularly in the United States, have gone overboard in their
zeal to accord programs protection at least equal to that given books and
other copyrighted works. 78 Furthermore, patents are increasingly per-
power to transfer a copyright license than a licensee that is not in bankruptcy. Harris v. Emus
Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the vitality of the Harris deci-
sion is doubtful. It was grounded in limiting language that appeared in the old Bankruptcy
Act but not in the current Bankruptcy Code. "Section 70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act pro-
vides for the transfer of all assets which the bankrupt 'could by any means have transferred
.. ' prior to the petition for bankruptcy." Id. at 1334.
72. 87 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1988).
73. Id.
74. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that were enacted in 1988 effectively prevent
an intellectual property license from terminating the licensee's right. See Thomas M.S.
Hemnes, Computer Software Licensing After the Enactment of the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy
Protection Act, COMPuTEk LAw., No. 10, Oct. 1988, at 7, 9.
75. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
77. Council Directive 91/250, art. 1, 1991 OJ. (L 122) 42, 44.
78. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238-40 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding copyright extends to the "structure, sequence, and organization" of a pro-
gram), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding copyright protection extends to machine-reada-
ble code), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding Lotus 1-2-3's user interface contains copyright-
able elements). These cases have recently been questioned. The Whelan court's "structure,
sequence, and organization" formula was not followed in Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc.,
775 F. Supp. 544, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Lotus arguably extends copyright protection beyond
that given to books in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879), which held that a method of
double entry book-keeping, manifested in the forms, charts, and columns printed in a trea-
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ceived as available for computer software, 79 according rights that are ar-
guably much deeper than those available under copyright.8 0
In the relaxed atmosphere encouraged by such broad noncontractual
protection for software, it is easy to overlook the fact that a "fully paid up,
royalty free, perpetual" license is virtually indistinguishable from the sale
of a copy. To return to the real estate model, a deed conveying the per-
petual right to use a parcel is considered a conveyance of fee simple, and
clauses in the conveyance purporting to restrict its alienation or attach-
ment are void under the rule of the Statute Quia Emptores. 81 It seems
likely that, given an appropriate case, a court would explode the fiction
that a fully paid up, royalty free, perpetual license is not a sale.
In the context of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the fic-
tion is regularly disregarded. In Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Com-
munications Inc.,82 the court held that installation by the plaintiff of its
specially designed computer software involved a transaction of movable,
tangible and identifiable products or "goods" under the U.C.C.8 3 The
court disregarded language in the agreement purporting to retain title in
the licensor and characterizing the agreement as a "license," in part be-
cause the licensee paid a one-time perpetual license fee. 84 The court con-
cluded that Article 2 of the U.C.C. governed the transaction.
85
If the license is merely a sale in disguise, then the clauses in the "li-
cense" agreement prohibiting subsequent transfer by the "licensee" are
nothing more than unenforceable restraints on alienation.8 6 Ironically, in
adopting a feudal model for software licensing, lawyers for vendors thus
sowed the seeds of its own demise. Just as the Statute Quia Emptores un-
dermined the feudal system, its latter-day progeny, the Copyright Act, pat-
ise, was not copyrightable. See also Ronald Abramson, Why Lotus-Paperback Uses the Wrong Test
And What the New Software Protection Legislation Should Look Like, COMPUTER LAW., No. 8, Aug.
1990, at 6-7; D. Lee Antton & Gary M. Hoffman, Copyright Protection and Innovation: The Impact
of Lotus Development v. Paperback Software, CoMPuTrR LAw., No. 8, Aug. 1990, at 1, 3.
79. See SoMA, supra note 4.
80. Unlike copyright, patent protects against the independent creation of the same in-
vention. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (defining exclusive rights of patentee) with 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (defining exclusive rights of copyright holder).
81. ARCHER, supra note 29, at 113.
82. 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988).
83. Id. at 345-46; see also Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir.
1991) (computer software is a "good" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania version of the
Uniform Commercial Code); RRX Indus., Inc. v. LAB-CON, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir.
1985) (computer software system was a "good" rather than a service, for purposes of the
California Commercial Code). But see United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir.
1991) (computer program was intangible intellectual property, and as such, did not consti-
tute goods, wares, merchandise, securities or monies within the meaning of the National
Stolen Property Act).
84. Communication Groups, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 345. Oddly, the court reasoned that this
made the transaction a lease, rather than a sale. In this regard, the court's reasoning was
probably result-oriented. Notwithstanding the U.C.C.'s statement that it only applies to sales,
courts have often applied it to leases where the lease has no termination date or the lessee
has continued, uninterrupted use of the leased item at the end of the lease. See L. J. KtrrraN,
COMPUTER SovrwAE: PROECrION/ LALtAirr/LAw/FoRMs, § 1.11 (2], at 1-27 (1993).
85. Communication Groups, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
86. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
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ent law, the common law and the Bankruptcy Code, 87 lie in wait to
challenge restraints on alienation imposed in a modem transaction, par-
ticularly if the transaction is a sale masquerading as a foeffment.
In at least one case, the restraints failed. In First Nationwide Bank v.
Florida Software Services,88 two software vendors had licensed computer
software programs to two savings and loan institutions ("S&Ls"). 89 The
licenses were each for five years, and required both up-front license fees
and quarterly payments.90 As is customary, the vendors' licenses required
the licensees to hold the software in secrecy and confidence, 9 1 and pre-
vented the licensees from transferring or assigning their interests in the
software without the consent of the vendors.
92
The S&Ls followed their own custom by becoming insolvent. Their
assets were acquired by the plaintiff in the action, First Nationwide Bank,
under procedures established by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). 93 The licenses were in ef-
fect at the time of the acquisition, and First Nationwide continued to use
the licensed software and to make the quarterly payments through the end
of the license terms.9 4 The vendors objected to such use on the ground
that it violated the anti-assignment provision of the license agreements.
95
They rather ungenerously offered consent, however, if the bank paid addi-
tional license fees totaling almost $2 million (the original license fees had
totaled about $750,000).96
The court refused to enforce the anti-assignment clause of the license
agreements, on two grounds: 1) permitting the assignment did not "in-
fringe on any substantive right of [the vendors]"; 9 7 and 2) requiring the
bank to pay an additional license fee "is contrary to the general contract
principles of good faith and fair dealing."98
The "general contract principles of good faith and fair dealing" are
not a satisfying explanation for the court's decision. The insolvent banks
knowingly accepted licenses that were not assignable. Presumably, they
might have bargained for assignable licenses, and paid a higher price for
the privilege of assignment. The court permitted them to transfer more
rights than they had, without paying the toll that a right to transfer might
87. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
88. 770 F. Supp. 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
89. Id. at 1539.
90. Id. The court's opinion does not state whether the quarterly payments were for the
right to use the software, for maintenance, or both.
91. Id. at 1540. The court's opinion notes that the banks had access to the vendors'
trade secrets." Id.
92. Id. at 1539.
93. Act of August 9, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 183
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821).
94. 770 F. Supp. at 1540. When the vendors refused to accept the quarterly payments,
the bank started depositing them into the court. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1539-40.
97. Id. at 1541. To the extent that this conclusion requires an interpretation of FIRREA,
it is beyond the scope of this paper.
98. Id. at 1542.
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have required. Does that order not violate the "principles of good faith
and fair dealing" as least as much as the licensors' insistence on an argua-
bly inflated transfer fee?
One might argue that the licensors sought to obtain, in effect, a wind-
fall from the licensees' misfortune in becoming insolvent. However, this
argument also falls short of the mark. It is the essence of contract law that
one may insist on the benefit of a bargain, even if its enforcement results
in an unexpected profit.
The court's comments only have force if one believes that the licen-
sors did in fact receive the benefit of their bargains. As has been noted,
the court based its conclusion on the finding that the use was permitted to
the original licensees, and that there had been no disclosure beyond that
permitted by the original licensees. In fact, there had been a new disclo-
sure, even if access to the program following the reorganization was lim-
ited to the same employees who had access before. After the
reorganization, those persons were employed by a new entity First Nation-
wide, which therefore gained access to the programs to the extent that a
corporation can ever have access to any form of information. However, it
is clear that the court had in mind what one might call the "objective"
extent of disclosure of the trade secrets-i.e. how many people knew and
used it-not the legal identity of the employer of those people.
In other words, the court's result seems correct, and its comment
about "good faith and fair dealing" appropriate, if one believes that the
identity of the licensee is immaterial to the license transaction. As long as
the licensee paid the homage the license required of it (i.e., did not ex-
ceed the licensee's scope of use and non-disclosure provisions), the licen-
sor cannot complain if the homage is paid by original Licensee A or by
Licensee B.
The elimination of the personal nature of the relation between lord
and tenant was, as we have seen, one of the fundamental changes wrought
by the Statute Quia Emptores. After the Statute Quia Emptores, a lord
could not complain if the identity of his tenant changed. 9 So also, under
the rule of First Nationwide, the identity of a software licensee is not a mate-
rial part of the vendor's bargain.100 It is the performance of the contract
that counts, regardless of the identity of the person performing it.
Under the Statute Quia Emptores, the substituted tenant held directly
of the lord, who could, in turn, proceed directly against the substituted
tenant for satisfaction of the terms of the fief. Whether a software vendor
could proceed directly against the transferee of a licensee's rights was not
resolved in First Nationwide. It is this question to which we now turn.
II. ALIENATION AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
The First Nationwide court was assisted in reaching its result because
the assignment of the license did not result in any expansion of the
99. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
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software's use or disclosure of the vendors' trade secrets to individuals
other than the ones who had access to the trade secrets under the original
agreement. 10 1 By the time the case was decided, the licenses had expired,
and the bank's respective obligation to comply with licenses was not at
issue.10 2 In many cases, these favorable conditions would not exist. As-
suming that First Nationwide represents the vanguard of what might be-
come a typical holding, the next question is whether restrictive covenants
imposed on licensees might be enforceable against transferees of the
software, even if clauses that prevent outright transfer are not. This ques-
tion intertwines with the difficult issue of the enforceability of "equitable
servitudes" on movable property.1 03 If the licensor cannot enforce mate-
rial terms of the license against the transferee, then the argument for en-
forcing the restraint on alienation is improved. At the same time, if the
restraint on alienation fails, the argument for enforcing the servitude be-
comes more compelling.
For our purposes, an equitable servitude may be defined as any limita-
tion or condition on the use of property short of a prohibition against its
transfer or alienation.1 0 4 Servitudes are very common in real estate, com-
paratively rare in the case of chattels, and ubiquitous in software licens-
ing.10 5 Virtually every software license imposes restrictions on the use of
the licensed software. 10 6 At a minimum, the license will ordinarily require
the licensee to hold the software in confidence, to make copies or deriva-
tive works only for specified purposes, and to restrict its use to certain
computers and locations.107
Equitable servitudes have a considerably shorter history than re-
straints on alienation. Their origin is ordinarily traced to the 1848 case of
Tulk v. Moxhay,108 decided by the English Court of Chancery. In Tulk v.
Moxhay, the plaintiff owned property in Leicester Square.10 9 He conveyed
the "Leicester Square Garden or Pleasure Ground" containing an "eques-
trian statue then standing in the centre thereof, and the iron railing and
stone work round the same" 110 to one Elms, who covenanted that he and
his heirs and assigns would maintain the Pleasure Garden and grant the
101. First Nationwide Bank v. Florida Software Serv., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1540 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
102. Id. at 1541.
103. Zechariah Chafee addressed the issue of the enforceability of "equitable servitudes"
in two articles: Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. Rev. 945
(1928) [hereinafter Chafee I]; Zechariah Chafee,Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round: Equita-
ble Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1956) [hereinafter Chafee II].
104. See Chafee I, supra note 103, at 946-48.
105. Based on personal knowledge and conversations with convey, assign, and commer-
cial attorneys in author's law firm.
106. In some cases, the licensors have attempted to extend the reach of their restrictive
covenants very far indeed. In Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), for
example, the license agreement between a software developer and its licensee included a 99-
year noncompetition provision that forbade the licensee from attempting independently to
implement the idea which the developer's program expressed. Id. at 978.
107. See, e.g., infra Appendix § 3.
108. 2 Ph. 774 (1848).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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plaintiff's tenants access to it."' The Pleasure Garden was eventually con-
veyed to the defendant, who proposed to build on it. 1 1 2 The Court of
Chancery affirmed an injunction preventing Elms' successor from doing
so.
1 1 3
Tulk v. Moxhay exemplifies the basic requirements for equitable en-
forcement of a servitude against a subsequent purchaser-that is, for the
covenant to "run" with the land.' 14 First, there must be notice of the servi-
tude. 115 In real estate, notice is invariably satisfied by including the servi-
tude in the deed, which is recorded and becomes part of the tide record
that a purchaser is assumed to have examined before purchasing the par-
cel. 116 Second, there must be a "dominant tenement" that benefits from
the servitude, or at least a "scheme" from which the party seeking to en-
force the covenant will benefit.117 In Tulk v. Moxhay, the plaintiff owned
several of the houses that formed Leicester Square, and the houses' occu-
pants were entitled to use the Pleasure Garden under the terms of the
servitude.' 1 8 Their benefit from the servitude is obvious. Third, the servi-
tude must satisfy some appropriate purpose appurtenant to the dominant
tenement, and must not impose a "new and unusual" incident on land
ownership. 119 This may be translated into a requirement that the servi-
tude must be something of the sort that a purchaser of property might
ordinarily expect to find, and not something that would impose an ex-
traordinary or bizarre burden on the purchaser. In Tulk v. Moxhay, the
obvious purpose was to enhance the value of properties in Leicester
Square by preserving a park-like enclosure that the plaintiff's tenants
could enjoy. Thus, one purchasing a park-like area in an otherwise resi-
dential neighborhood might reasonably expect that there is some reason
why no one has previously built on the park. In later cases, particularly in
the United States, this third requirement has been supplemented with the
111. Id.
112. Id. at 775.
113. Id. at 779.
114. The precise holding of Tulk v. Moxhay was that equity would enforce a servitude that
would not "run" with the land as a matter of law. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 1117
n.13. In England, covenants would "run" as a matter of law only if there were a tenurial
relation between the original covenantor and covenantee. CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEB-
MAN, PROPERTY ANn LAw 9589 (2d ed. 1985). Under this rule, the covenant in Tulk v. Moxhay
would not have "run" at law because it was contained in a deed conveying fee simple as
opposed to a deed conveying a tenancy. This limitation is not applicable in the United States
where, as has been noted, the feudal or tenurial system of land ownership was never effec-
tively established. Thus, for example, in Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938), the court enforced a covenant contained in a
deed that was not in the nature of a leasehold. Although technical differences between cove-
nants running at law and at equity may remain, they are both beyond this Article's scope, and
not immediately pertinent to the possible extension of the real property principles to the
field of intellectual property licensing discussed in the text.
115. See, e.g., Smith v. Wedgwood Builders Corp., 590 A.2d 186, 189 (N.H. 1991) (notice
requirement in statute not met). For these requirements, see generally CASNER & LEACH,
supra note 10, at 1115-32.
116. Smith, 590 A.2d at 190 (bona fide purchaser has duty to investigate).
117. See Werner v. Graham, 183 P. 945, 947 (Cal. 1919).
118. 2 Ph. at 774.
119. Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (Mass. 1855).
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principle that the servitude cannot violate public policy.1 20 Thus, for ex-
ample, a servitude that prevents the sale of property to persons of a partic-
ular race is unenforceable.
12 1
The law of equitable servitudes never found a stable home in the gen-
eral law of chattels.122 Attempted servitudes on chattels frequently took
the form of manufacturers' efforts to control the price at which, or territo-
ries in which, articles of commerce could be sold by distributors and retail-
ers. 123 Such restrictions were almost universally perceived as unlawful
restraints on alienation. 12 4 Chafee argues convincingly that this rationale
fails completely to appreciate the distinction between "conditions which
totally restrain alienation by enabling the seller to recover the sold prop-
erty" and those "which merely give the seller some measure of equitable
control over its disposition in the hands of later owners, who never cease
to retain the property."125 Nevertheless, he concedes that there are signif-
icant differences between a servitude on a chattel and one on land.
1 26
The principal differences Chafee cites are these: (1) "Land remains in the
same hands for comparatively long periods of time and is transferred after
an elaborate investigation of the title, whereas chattels are ordinarily sold
with rapidity";12 7 (2) "restrictions on land [use] arise from the desire to
protect a neighborhood as a rough unit... [for which there is no analogue
in chattels]";' 28 and (3) restrictions on land "do not endure forever, but
lapse when the preservation of the desired neighborhood standard can no
longer be accomplished." 12 9 With chattels it is very difficult to define a
"dominant tenement" that is benefitted by the servitude. Chafee postu-
lates that the manufacturer's business and marketing scheme should suf-
fice to fill this role. 130 However, this consideration is probably more than
counterbalanced by the fact that the benefit to the manufacturer is in di-
rect conflict with the interest of distributors, retailers and consumers in
paying a lower price for the manufacturer's goods.' 3 ' By contrast, many
equitable servitudes on land are mutual in nature: all of the members of a
120. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21 (1948) (court would not enforce covenant
that promoted racial inequality).
121. Id. at 23.
122. Chafee I, supra note 103, at 977-87, 1011-13 passim. Chafee pointed to "the [counter-
vailing] economic claims of consumers and independent wholesalers and retailers, [and] the
immense judicial labor required for a satisfactory development of the operation and limits of
the proposed device." Id. at 1013.
123. See id. at 980-82 (summarizing and citing cases).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 983.




130. Id. at 964, 986.
131. This interest forms the basis for the antitrust principle that resale price maintenance
schemes are per se unlawful. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 408-09 (1911). Although Chafee questions the economic basis for this ruling, he seems
ultimately to have resigned himself to the strength of the interests represented by "consum-
ers and independent wholesalers and retailers," Compare Chafee I, supra note 103, at 988-995
with id. at 1013.
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neighborhood are both burdened and benefitted by the set of
restrictions. 1
3 2
The important question for our purposes is whether intellectual prop-
erty licensing in general, and software licensing in particular, is more like
real property, where equitable servitudes are widely enforced, or chattels,
where they are not. To analyze this question, it is useful to distinguish
among the types of restrictions that software vendors commonly seek to
impose on their licensees. Although a complete survey would be beyond
the scope of this paper, it is possible to describe and analyze a few broad
categories.
The first of these categories might be described as restrictions that are
necessary to preserve the commercial value of the software. The most ob-
vious are confidentiality obligations that are required to preserve trade
secret protection for the licensed software. 133 There is a compelling argu-
ment that restrictions in this first category should "run" with the licensed
right and be enforceable against transferees of the original licensee who
take with notice of them. In the first place, it is easy to determine a domi-
nant tenement that is benefitted by the servitude: the vendor's trade se-
cret.' 3 4 Second, the vendor can easily provide for notice by including a
simple statement on the diskettes or other media that contain the pro-
gram, and by causing the program to display a proprietary rights notice
when the software is first turned on. Third, the restriction is hardly novel
or unexpected. It serves the appropriate purpose of preserving the value
of the software not only for the vendor, but for all of its other licensees.
All licensees presumably paid for the right to use the software, and their
investments would be made worthless if the software became freely avail-
able to the public without charge.
Restrictions on the scope of the licensee's use, such as limitations to
use on a single central processing unit, or on a network of defined loca-
tion, should probably fall into the same enforceable category.' 3 5 Again,
such restrictions are entirely within the realm of what a purchaser of com-
132. See, e.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 197 N.E. 224, 226 (Mass. 1935). The servitude in Tulk v.
Moxhay was an exception to this principle, since it burdened only the Pleasure Garden parcel,
while benefitting all of the other parcels on Leicester Square. Nevertheless, as the court
noted in that case, "nothing could be more inequitable than that the original purchaser
should be able to sell the property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the
assignee being allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken." 2 Ph.
at 776-77.
133. See supra note 7.
134. Chafee argues that a patent or copyright should also provide a dominant tenement
supporting a servitude. See Chafee I, supra note 103, at 998. But the courts have been less
than enthusiastic in enforcing patentees' and copyright proprietors' efforts to create servi-
tudes. Id. at 999-1005. There is, however, a distinctive difference between the confidentiality
required to support a trade secret and the price, territorial and other restrictions attempted
by patentees and copyright holders. Copyrights and patents arise by statute, and copyright
holders or patentees will retain substantial rights even if restrictions on resale price or terri-
tory are not enforced. By contrast, a trade secret will lose its protected status if enforceable
confidentiality obligations are not imposed on all who lawfully come into possession of the
secret.
135. A variation on such a restriction would be a license term that requires the licensee to
pay an additional license fee for expanded use.
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puter software would expect to find. Without such restrictions, every li-
censee would be entitled to unlimited use, and it would be impossible to
establish a price for the software. Furthermore, restrictions on the licen-
see's scope of use are consistent with statutory limitations on the rights of
the owner of a copy under the Copyright Act' 36 and with the rights of the
purchaser of a patented article under patent law.' 3 7 Thus, to the extent
that licensed rights become more freely transferable, public policy, as ad-
umbrated in the copyright and patent laws, would seem to support en-
forcement of the restrictions.1
3 8
Other covenants contained in many software licenses are more prob-
lematic. Suppose, for example, that the original licensee has agreed to
cross-license its own technology to the software vendor, to assist the ven-
dor in performing research and development, or to indemnify the vendor
for claims of third parties to whom the licensee provides goods or services
using the licensed software. Such covenants frequently form an important
part of the bargain in licensing transactions, and it would be just as inequi-
table to allow a transferee of the licensed rights to take free of them as it
would have been to allow the transferee of Elms' parcel to take free of the
restrictions Elms had agreed to in Tulk v. Moxhay. On the other hand,
covenants of this type are not usually essential to preserve the trade secret
status or commercial value of the licensed software.' 3 9 In addition, they
are almost always novel, unpredictable, and unexpected, and a transferee's
ability to meet such obligations is likely to be wholly different from that of
the original licensee. If, for example, part of the consideration for the
license was a cross-license from the original licensee, a transferee who was
not a successor to the original licensee's business would probably lack the
technology sought to be cross-licensed. In this event, the licensor would
lose a fundamental part of the benefit of its original bargain.
Some novel executory obligations may fail for reasons of public pol-
icy. For example, the licensor in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds
140
sought to prevent its licensee from competing with the licensed product
for a period of 99 years. 14 1 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
this burden so onerous that it refused to entertain the licensor's action for
copyright infringement against the original licensee. 142 A fortiori, this re-
136. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1988), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
137. See DONALD S. CHISUM, PATNTrS: A TREATISE ON THE 1AW OF PATENTABILTY, VALIDrrY
AND INFUNGEMENT § 16.03[2] (1991).
138. Another class of covenants that should probably "run" with the software are warranty
limitations and limitations on liability. Subject to important public policy restrictions, such
covenants (to the extent that they constitute covenants of the licensee at all) commonly "run"
with chattels, as a result of the decline of privity of contract in the field of product liability.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1990). There is no reason to suppose
that they should not also "run" with license software rights.
139. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (requirements for trade secret
protection).
140. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
141. Id. at 973.
142. Id. at 979. This rationale required an extension of very thin existing precedent, and
has been justifiably criticized on the ground that "it permits the misuse defense to be collater-
ally asserted by a willful infringer not personally injured by the copyright holder's conduct."
Philip Abromats, Anticompetitive Software Licensing Restrictions as Copyright Misuse, 10 SorrwARE
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striction should not be enforceable against a transferee of the licensed
software.
Even if restrictions falling into this third category do not violate an
obvious public policy, there is nevertheless a strong argument that they do
not meet the criteria for enforcement of an equitable servitude. This
brings us back to the question with which we began this section of this
paper. The First Nationwide court based its refusal to enforce a restraint on
the alienation of licensed software rights on a finding that the transferee
had complied with all material covenants of the software license. 143 This
led to the question whether the software licensors in First Nationwide could
have enforced those covenants against the transferees if there had been a
default. If the analogy to equitable servitudes on real property holds, the
author concludes that restraints of the type imposed in First Nationwide
would have been enforceable against the transferees, even in the absence
of their express consent, as long as they had notice of the restraints. The
restraints, which limited use of the software and protected against public
disclosure, were typical, predictable, and essential to the protection of the
licensed software rights. 14 4 The enforceability of the restraints supports
the conclusion that the license should be transferrable because the licen-
sor is no worse off after the transfer than it was before.
On the other hand, the analogy to equitable servitudes suggests that
many complex and novel restrictions and covenants would not be enforce-
able against subsequent transferees. This in turn suggests that restraints
on alienation of a license that contains such restrictions and covenants
should be enforced. In such a case, the relation between licensor and
licensee is truly personal in nature because no one but the particular licen-
see is likely to be in a position to satisfy the terms of the license. The
software license then retains its tenurial quality. The licensee should no
more be permitted to transfer its rights without the consent of the licensor
than a Twelfth Century tenant should have been able to transfer his land
without the consent of his lord.
It thus appears that the question of what rights in computer software
should be freely alienable depends in important measure on the question
of whether the licensor can enforce the terms of the license against the
transferee. If the traditional criteria for enforcement of an equitable servi-
tude against transferees are met-the existence of a dominant tenement,
notice, and absence of novelty145 -then the terms should be enforceable
against a transferee and the argument for enforcing a restraint against
transfer fails. However, if the license imposes terms that are enforceable
against the original licensee, but that otherwise do not meet the criteria
for enforcement of a servitude, then the argument for enforcing the re-
straint is compelling.
PRoTEcrION 3 (1991). See also Christina Ambrosio & Roni Schneider, Note, Copyright Misuse
... Getting Defensive: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6J. LEGAL COMM. 181 (1990).
143. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 104-132 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
We began this inquiry by asking why computer software is licensed at
all. The explanation is that the practice arose at a time when the only
effective means of protecting rights in software was by trade secret law, and
most software was tailor-made for a particular application. To accommo-
date these facts, lawyers re-created a system of software exploitation that is
surprisingly analogous to the feudal system of land tenure that existed in
England and Normandy prior to the Statute Quia Emptores. In each case,
the system is characterized by personal obligations flowing between licen-
sor (lord) and licensee (tenant) and restraints on alienation by the licen-
see (tenant) without the consent of the licensor (lord).
The feudal system of land tenure could not be sustained indefinitely.
It was always pardy fictional, was inconsistent with English traditions that
encouraged free alienability of land rights, and, to the extent that it had
been required as a quasi-military means of securing land use, became un-
necessary as the legal framework for land ownership stabilized. The Stat-
ute Quia Emptores, which permitted alienation of tenures by substitution
of a new tenant without the consent of the feudal law, both manifested
and accelerated its demise.
Computer software licensing is following a very similar course. Origi-
nally justified by the necessity of protecting software as a trade secret,
software licensing now appears to be both unnecessary, in light of ex-
panding copyright and patent protection, and inconsistent with the gen-
eral right of alienation that appears in the common law, the Copyright
Act, patent law, the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code.
Furthermore, the personal nature of software programming services has
given way to widespread commerce in software as a basic commodity.
These changed circumstances have placed pressure on restraints on alien-
ation that are a hallmark of traditional software licensing.
To keep current with the changing environment, courts will need to
address the question of whether, and to what extent, restrictive covenants,
short of outright prohibition on alienation, should be enforceable against
transferees of licensed software rights. Real estate law governing the "run-
ning" of equitable servitudes provides a useful guide to the sorts of cove-
nants that should be enforceable against transferees and those that should
not. Where the material covenants in a license "run" under these criteria,
there will be a strong argument against the enforcement of outright re-
straints on alienation. These will generally be circumstances in which the
license does not impose restrictions on the licensee other than those af-
fecting the scope of use, nondisclosure, and warranties' limitations.
Where, on the other hand, the license imposes complex obligations such
as cross-licenses, the covenants will not "run." In combination with cove-
nants that do not "run," license terms limiting restraints on alienation
should be enforced.
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APPENDIX
[NAME OF LICENSOR]




The LICENSOR ("LICENSOR") and LICENSEE identified above
("LICENSEE") agree that LICENSOR's attached Terms and Conditions of
License, which are incorporated herein and made a part hereof, shall gov-
ern any license of computer software by LICENSOR to LICENSEE. LI-
CENSEE may license particular software programs from LICENSOR by







SCHEDULE TO SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT
The undersigned LICENSEE hereby agrees to license from LICEN-
SOR, INC. ("LICENSOR") the software identified below, pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the Software License Agreement previously exe-
cuted by LICENSEE and LICENSOR.
I. SOFTWARE:[2]_
II. DESIGNATED SYSTEMI3]:






LOCATION OF SYSTEM [4]:
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This Schedule is subject to and a part of the Software License








TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SOFTWARE LICENSE
1. Definitions:.
a. This "Agreement" shall mean these Terms and Conditions, the
Software License Agreement to which these Terms and Conditions are at-
tached, any Schedules hereto.
b. "Designated System" for any individual item of Software shall
mean the computer system identified in a Schedule to this Agreement.
c. "Software" shall mean each computer program described in a
Schedule to this Agreement, and any update that may be furnished by
LICENSOR to user, provided that LICENSOR shall not be obligated to
furnish updates. [5]
d. "License" and "Licenses" shall mean the grant or grants of the
right to use Software made by LICENSOR to LICENSEE pursuant to Sec-
tion 3.
e. "Proprietary Material" shall mean Software and any information
or materials received by LICENSEE and identified by LICENSOR as pro-
prietary or confidential, including without limitation user manuals and
other documentation, but excluding information or material that be-
comes generally known to the public through no fault of LICENSEE. [6]
2. Preliminary Terms.
a. All licenses of Software by LICENSOR are subject to these Terms
and Conditions. By submitting an order to LICENSOR or by accepting
delivery of Software or a component thereof, LICENSEE agrees to be sub-
ject to these Terms and Conditions. Any provision of LICENSEE's order
which is inconsistent with or in addition to these Terms and Conditions
shall not be binding upon LICENSOR unless LICENSOR expressly agrees
in writing to such provision. [7]
b. LICENSOR may amend these Terms and Conditions from time
to time. The then current Terms and Conditions shall apply to all
Software delivered to LICENSEE after any such amendment. [8]
3. License
a. LICENSOR grants to LICENSEE a non-transferable and non-ex-
clusive license [9] to use each item of Software for which the license fee has
been paid in machine-readable object code[10] form on only the Desig-
nated System identified as such in the Schedule relating to such software.
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Such license shall include the right to operate and perform the Software
but shall not include any right to copy (except as provided in Section 8),
modify, market, sublicense or distribute the Software, to make the
Software available to any other person, whether on a time sharing basis or
otherwise, or to create works derivative of the Software. [11]
b. The Software may be used only on the Designated System. [12] No
title or ownership of the Software or any part thereof will be transferred to
LICENSEE. LICENSEE acknowledges that LICENSEE is acquiring only a
license to use the Software and not any title to or ownership of the
Software or any part thereof.[13]
c. The term of the license for each item of Software will continue
until LICENSOR terminates the license as provided herein.[14] LICEN-
SOR may terminate a license with respect to the Software covered by any
one or more Schedules if LICENSOR gives written notice to LICENSEE
specifying any failure or default in the performance of any provisions of
these Terms and Conditions and LICENSEE fails to cure said failure or
default to the reasonable satisfaction of LICENSOR within thirty (30) days
after such notice. LICENSEE shall, upon the termination of the license
for any item of Software, immediately cease all use of the Software covered
by such license and return to LICENSOR all copies of the Software and
related documentation covered by such license. LICENSEE's obligations
with respect to Software under this Section 3 shall survive any termination
of the license applicable to such Software. [15]
4. Patent and Copyright
Indemnification:[16]
a. LICENSOR shall defend or, at its option, settle, any claim or pro-
ceeding brought against LICENSEE to the extent that it is based on an
assertion that the Software infringes any United States patent, copyright,
or trade secret right[ 17] of any third party and shall indemnify LICENSEE
against all costs, damages and expenses finally awarded against LICENSEE
which result from any such claim[18], provided that LICENSOR shall have
no liability hereunder unless LICENSEE notifies LICENSOR promptly in
writing of any such claim or proceeding and gives LICENSOR full and
complete authority, information and assistance to defend such claim or
proceeding, and further provided that LICENSEE gives LICENSOR sole
control of the defense of any such claim or proceeding and all negotia-
tions for its compromise or settlement. [ 19] Should any Software become,
or in LICENSOR's opinion be likely to become, the subject of a claim of
infringement, LICENSOR shall have the right, at LICENSOR's option and
expense, (i) to procure for LICENSEE the right to continue using it, (ii)
to replace or modify it with a non-infringing version of substantially
equivalent function and performance or (iii) reasonably failing the above,
to pay to LICENSEE the depreciated value of the relevant Software upon
LICENSEE's return of the Software to LICENSOR. [20] The depreciated
value shall be determined by the straight line method, for a five (5) year
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life, applied to the amount actually paid by LICENSEE for the relevant
Software license.
b. LICENSOR shall have no liability or obligation to LICENSEE
hereunder for any infringement based upon (i) the combination of a LI-
CENSOR product with other products not produced by LICENSOR; (ii)
the use of other than a current, unaltered version of the Software; or (iii)
any use of Software in the practice of a process not specified by LICEN-
SOR[21] LICENSOR shall have no obligation for any costs incurred by
LICENSEE without LICENSOR's prior written authorization. In no event
shall liability hereunder exceed the charges paid by LICENSEE to LICEN-
SOR for the infringing Software. The provisions of this Section 4 are in
lieu of all other obligations, including without limitation the implied war-
ranty of noninfringement, and state the sole, exclusive and entire liability
of LICENSOR, and the sole, exclusive and entire remedy of LICENSEE,
with respect to any claim of patent, copyright, or trade secret infringement
by any Software.
5. Warranty-[22]
a. LICENSOR warrants that with normal use and service each item
of Software will conform substantially[23] to the user documentation LI-
CENSOR delivered with such Software for a period of ninety (90) days
from the date of such delivery, provided that such Software has not been
modified or altered by any one other than LICENSOR, has not been
abused or misapplied, and has not been used in combination with hard-
ware or software other than the Designated System.
b. The foregoing warranty shall be void if LICENSEE fails to submit
a completed Problem Report describing the condition that LICENSEE be-
lieves constitutes a breach of the said warranty, together with a floppy disk
on which LICENSEE has made a copy of that portion of the Software that
LICENSEE believes to contain such condition, within 10 days after LICEN-
SEE discovers such condition.
c. In the event of a breach of warranty, LICENSOR's sole responsi-
bility shall be to replace, at its own expense, the nonconforming Software
with a corrected copy upon the return to LICENSOR of all of LICENSEE's
copies of the nonconforming Software.
6. Disclaimer of Warranty EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN
SECTIONS 4 AND 5, LICENSOR SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO HAVE
MADE ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IM-
PLIED, AS TO THE CONDITION, MERCHANTABILITY, DESIGN, OP-
ERATION OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF THE
SOFTWARE OR ANY OTHER REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY
WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE
SOFTWARE.
7. Limitation of Liability The liability of LICENSOR for any loss or
damages directly or indirectly suffered by LICENSEE as a result of the
Software shall in no event exceed the charges paid by LICENSEE for the
relevant copy of Software. If no separate fee or charge was paid by LICEN-
SEE in acquiring such copy, LICENSOR's liability shall be limited to the
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payment to LICENSEE of LICENSOR's suggested retail charge in effect at
the time LICENSEE acquired such copy for a license to use such copy on a
single Designated System. IN NO EVENT SHALL LICENSOR BE LIABLE
FOR SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR TORT DAMAGES,
EVEN IF LICENSOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCH DAMAGES.
8. Proprietary Rights; Non-disclosure by LICENSEE:
a. LICENSEE acknowledges that all title and interest, including all
patents, copyrights and trade secret rights, in the Software are the exclu-
sive property of LICENSOR or its licensor.[24] LICENSEE further ac-
knowledges that Proprietary Material is proprietary and a trade secret of
LICENSOR.[25] LICENSEE agrees neither to do nor to permit any act
which may in any way jeopardize or be detrimental to the validity of LI-
CENSOR's patent, copyright, trade secret or other rights in the Software
or other Proprietary Material.
b. LICENSEE shall use its best efforts to maintain the confidentiality
of Proprietary Material and to protect LICENSOR's patents, copyrights
and trade secrets, including taking such steps as LICENSEE takes to pro-
tect its own patents, copyrights and trade secrets.[26]
c. Proprietary Material is provided for use only on the Designated
System and may not be copied, except that one copy of the Software may
be made for back-up purposes for use on the Designated System. The
back-up copy must include LICENSOR's patent, copyright and proprietary
rights notices and all labels or other features that disclose the Software
name and LICENSEE's site and designated system. [27]
d. LICENSEE's obligations here to protect the confidential and pro-
prietary nature of Proprietary Material under this Section 8 shall survive
any termination or expiration of a license for any reason. [28]
9. Quotations. Any quotation issued by LICENSOR is subject to these
Terms and Conditions. No quotation shall be valid unless in writing, and
any quotation shall expire 60 days after issuance, unless otherwise speci-
fied in writing by LICENSOR.
10. Orders. All orders are subject to acceptance by LICENSOR at its
principal place of business. LICENSOR will notify LICENSEE of the esti-
mated shipping date of the Software. LICENSOR may cancel any order or
delay the shipment thereof for failure of LICENSEE to make payment of
any amount due LICENSOR or if LICENSEE is insolvent, is subject of any
proceeding, voluntary or involuntary, under any bankruptcy or insolvency
law or executes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or if a receiver
or trustee is appointed for LICENSEE. [29]
11. Prices and Terms of Payment.
a. Prices are exclusive of, and LICENSEE agrees to pay or provide
an appropriate exemption certificate for, all governmental taxes, fees and
duties (exclusive of taxes based upon LICENSOR's net income), including
but not limited to all sales, use, ownership, value added or other taxes.
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Prices are exclusive of all transportation and insurance charges; shipments
will be insured at LICENSEE's written request and expense.
b. LICENSEE shall pay LICENSOR the total price due hereunder
net thirty (30) days from the date of shipment. [30]
12. Shipmentr All shipments shall be F.O.B. LICENSOR and unin-
sured, unless LICENSEE specifies insurance in writing. LICENSOR will
use reasonable efforts to ship on or before the estimated shipping dates.
Shipping dates are approximate. LICENSOR shall have no liability for any
shipping delay. Unless otherwise specified in writing by LICENSEE, par-
tial shipments are allowed. [31]
13. Generat
a. This Agreement and the Schedules hereto constitute and incor-
porate the parties' entire agreement with respect to their subject matter,
and supersede any and all prior oral and written agreements, understand-
ings and quotations. No waiver, alteration, modification, or cancellation
of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding unless made in
writing and signed by LICENSOR. The failure of either party at any time
or times to require performance of any provision hereof shall in no man-
ner affect its right at a later time to enforce such provision.
b. Neither LICENSOR nor LICENSEE shall be liable for any delay
or failure to take any action required hereunder (except for payment) due
to any cause beyond the reasonable control of LICENSOR or LICENSEE,
as the case may be, including, but not limited to, unavailability or
shortages of labor, materials, or equipment, failure or delays in the deliv-
ery of vendors and suppliers or delays in transportation. [32]
c. This Agreement, and the transactions to which it relates, will be
governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the law of
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, excluding its choice of law rules
and also excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods.[33] Any claims or legal actions by one party
against the other shall be commenced and maintained in any state or fed-
eral court located in Massachusetts, U.S.A., and both parties hereby sub-
mit to the jurisdiction and venue of any such court. [34] In any such
action, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attor-
neys fees, in addition to all other remedies and recoveries that may be
available to it at law or in equity.J[35] For purposes of the immediately
preceding sentence, "attorneys fees" shall include services relating to the
claim or dispute rendered prior to the litigation; at both the trial and ap-
pellate levels; subsequent to judgment in obtaining any execution or en-
forcement thereof; and in connection with any bankruptcy or similar
proceeding.
d. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be unenforceable
the remaining portions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect [36]
e. Regardless of any disclosure by LICENSEE to LICENSOR of the
ultimate destination of any Software, LICENSEE will not directly or indi-
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rectly export any Software without first obtaining the appropriate United
States export license.
f. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the parties and their respective successors, assigns and legal representa-
tives; provided, however, that LICENSEE shall not sublicense, assign or
transfer any part or all of its rights and obligations under this Agreement
without the express written consent of LICENSOR. [37]
